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Abstract 
This paper argues that before the world started to globalize, the differences in the 
geographical endowments that different population faced were the most important 
constraints to their long-term production and consumption. The paper uses this 
central hypothesis to explain the sharp contrast between the flourishing Song and 
the stagnant Ming and Qing. During the Song dynasty, despite the fact that China 
lost a significant amount of arable land to invading nomads as its population 
peaked, China witnessed a higher urbanization level, more prosperous commerce 
and international trade, and an explosion of technical inventions and institutional 
innovations. However, after having significantly improved its man-to-land ratio in 
the period after the Song China only found itself induced deeper into the agrarian 
trap, resulting in reduced urbanization, withering foreign trade, a declining 
division of labor, and stagnant in technology. 
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I. Introduction   
1.1 Why was Needham puzzled? 
A question academically interesting but challenging at the same time was first raised by 
Joseph Needham (1981), which has mesmerized many scholars since.  In his multi-
volumed Science and Civilization in China Needham documents in great detail what 
China achieved in technology, as exemplified by its advanced agricultural technology, 
numerous inventions, highly developed mining, iron and steel production technology.  
China also was the first to learn how to manufacture sophisticated products such as 
porcelain, silk, and how to build large ocean-going ships equipped with magnetic 
compass.  Needham concludes that China was the leading nation in technology over 
fourteen centuries prior to the 16th century (1981 p3).   
Bewildered by his own findings about China’s protracted technological domination and 
its sudden dissipation, Needham summarizes his famous puzzle in Science in Traditional 
China (1981): 
 “...the question [is] why modern science, the ‘new or experimental’ philosophy of the 
time of Galileo, had arisen only in European culture and not in Chinese or Indian….a 
second question hiding behind that first one: namely, how could it be that the Chinese 
civilization had been much more effective than the European in finding out about Nature 
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and using natural knowledge for the benefit of mankind for fourteen centuries or so 
before the scientific revolution?”2  
A closer look reveals that the Needham puzzle actually contains four issues (hereinafter 
the Needham issues).  First, why was China not a leading nation in the world before the 
2nd century AD? Second, why did modern science or the experimental philosophy in 
Needham’s words, only emerge from European culture? Third, why did China become a 
leading nation only in the field of practical technique during the following 14 centuries? 
Fourth, why from the 16th century on, did China become a backward nation again even 
in practical technique? Because of the limited space, this paper will only address the third 
and fourth Needham issues.3 
The dramatic rise and fall of China in its growth and development was also documented 
in Angus Maddison’s book entitled The World Economy (2001, Figure 1-4, p.42; p.117). 
Combining the findings of Needham and Maddison, we can conclude the following: First, 
from at least the beginning of the first century AD, until the beginning of the 19th century, 
China was the largest economy in the world.  Second, from the second century AD to the 
16th century China led the world in technology.  Third, from the 5th to the 14th century 
AD, China led the world even in per capita income.  It is interesting to ask why China 
lost all these titles during a period of about 300 hundred year, and by the beginning of 
19th century, it had already became one of the poorest nations in the World?  
1.2 Earlier explanations 
                                                 
2J. Needham, “Science in Traditional China”, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981, 
p3. There are numerous versions Needham puzzle phrased by Needham at different stage of his research. 
The above-mentioned represents the best phrased one at a later stage of his long life shortly before his 
health started to deteriorate in the mid-1980s. 
3 Readers who are interested in my approach to the first and second Needham issues are welcome to contact 
the author to get a full-fledged paper through e-mail correspondence. 
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Various hypotheses were put forward over the years, trying to answer Needham’s puzzle.  
One that remains influential even today was proposed by Elvin (1973). 4  According to 
him, the steadily increasing population against fixed arable land led to worsening man-to-
land ratio, shrinking social surpluses, resulting in declining price of labor relative to 
capital goods.  This in turn deprived China of demand for labor-saving technology, 
slowed down China’s technical progress, and led China to be confined by a high-level 
equilibrium trap.5  Although Elvin’s hypothesis remains orthodox today, we will show in 
Section II that actually during most of the long period after the Song dynasty China saw 
improvement in its man-to-land ratio before the middle or late Qing, by then Chin already 
lost its lead in technology and per capita income. Therefore, Elvin’s hypothesis seems 
difficult to explain Needham puzzle.    
Lin (1995) put forward a hypothesis on switching of mode of invention.  According to 
him, before the 16th century, most technological inventions were experience-based, 
hence population size was the main variable determining the pace of inventions.  As the 
most populous nation, China had the richest collective experience, and therefore should 
be expected to have an edge over other nations in technological breakthroughs.  After the 
16th century, technological innovation in Europe was experiment-based, and the 
frequency of experiments instead of population size became the main determinant of 
technical progress.  China failed to switch to this new mode of invention, and has lagged 
behind Europe since then.  Both of the invention modes rely on trial and error to find new 
knowledge. But the first mode does not use theories as guidelines.  It depends instead on 
cumulative experiences, and population size matters for this reason.  Under the second 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, in his 1998 book and 2006 article, Landes cites Elvin numerous times.  
5 It is numbered Figure 4 in Elvin’s 1973 book. 
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mode, where theories are used, breakthroughs can be made much more rapidly by raising 
the frequency of experiments to exclude ungrounded hypotheses or less desirable results.  
Therefore, the importance of population in invention is greatly reduced. 
Lin’s hypothesis is supported by Diamond (1997).  He has established that only limited 
localities on earth had the carrying capacity to support a relatively large population 
cluster6 at the early stage of human evolution before the agricultural revolution.  He has 
also established why a population cluster must be sizable before it could evolve into a 
civilization.7  What Kremer (1993) finds in his empirical test seems to provide ground to 
Lin’s hypothesis.  Using the population data of the period 1,000,000 B.C. to 1990 on a 
global scale, he finds that historically, “among societies with no possibility for 
technological contact, those with larger initial populations have had faster technological 
change and population growth.”   
However, Lin leaves a number of questions unanswered.  First, why did the Greek 
civilization with a relatively small population size reach a level of technology and 
knowledge in almost all the fields of human activity much higher than nations with huge 
population size?  Second, why did Europe succeed in finding the new invention mode 
around the 16th century while China failed? Third, when China’s population size became 
much larger after the mid-Ming, and particularly after the mid-Qing relative to that of the 
                                                 
6 Population cluster or human cluster in this article refers to any autonomous community.  It could be a 
group of people, an extended family, a tribe, a tribal union, a kingdom, a city state, or an empire.   
7 According to Mokyr (1999), Diamond is talking about the importance of population density instead of 
population size.  The two terms are not necessarily equivalent. If we assume the boundary of a civilization 
remains unchanged throughout history, then population growth automatically leads to rising population 
density and population size.  If its boundaries are not stable, as is often the case in the real world, then the 
rise in population density is not automatically equivalent to an increase in population size.  Losses of 
territory may lead to much raised population density as a result of an influx of refugees from the land lost 
to the invading enemy. However, territorial expansion into formerly sparsely populated area will decrease 
the nation’s overall population density, but increase, however slightly, the total population size.  
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Song, why did China become so quiet in invention and innovation compared to the Song 
and earlier periods when China’s population was much smaller?   
1.3 The Organization of the Paper 
Section II introduces the central hypothesis of the paper after discussing the economic 
implications of geographical endowments as economic constraints.  Section III answers 
the third Needham puzzle by discussing the Elvin hypothesis and the technological 
explosion in the Song dynasty. Section IV answers the fourth Needham issues by 
showing why China was trapped in an agrarian situation.  Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Geographical Endowments and Long-term Economic Growth   
2.1 Geographical endowments as important budget constraints 
Economists have stayed away from this seemingly treacherous territory, except for a few 
such as Heckscher, Ohlin, and Krugman. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model uses the 
difference in natural endowments of various factors of production across nations to 
explain the origin of international trade.  Among contemporary economists, Krugman 
most enthusiastically emphasizes the relevance of geography in economic studies.  In his 
book entitled Geography and Trade (1991), he criticizes many economists to simply 
assume away the impacts of geographical factors because they are difficult to be 
quantified.8 
                                                 
8 See Krugman, 1991, page 99-100.  Unfortunately, by assuming away impacts of geography, all 
economies, small or large, reduce to a single point.  All distances disappear too when transportation cost is 
assumed zero, and flow of information is assumed perfectly smooth.  Increasing returns to scale, one of the 
main sources of endogenous growth, is also often conveniently swept under the rug because it is difficult to 
incorporate into the traditional general equilibrium model, which is based on constant returns to scale 
assumption. 
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Let’s see why geographical endowments were of great importance, especially at the early 
stages of human development.  In economics, we assume that a decision maker, be it a 
person, a firm, or a community, has a utility function, a production function, and a 
number of budget constraints.  We can argue that when the early Homo sapiens were 
migrating out of southeast Africa, there should not have been significant differentiations 
in their culture, preferences, technology, production, and social organizations, since these 
Homo sapiens had evolved in the same environment up to then.  However, once they 
were re-settled by chance in different geographical locations, the geographical 
environments would have imposed various constraints on their patterns of production and 
consumption.  
Hence, it is safe to assume that all human clusters at this early stage had similar utility 
and production functions.  What made them different were the different budget 
constraints they faced.  Among the explicit inputs in a production function, including 
capital, land, labor, and technology, land was the most important. This is because at very 
low productivity, there should not be significant differences across human clusters in 
accumulations of human and physical capital.  Lack of social surplus precluded the 
emergence of a leisure class who could afford to devote time and resources to 
accumulating knowledge. At this early stage, even the size of population was mostly 
determined by the initial carrying capacity of the land.  Therefore, at least two important 
arguments in a production function, i.e., land and labor, were actually geographically 
determined at first. 
In this paper the term “geographical endowments” is used to capture many implicit 
factors that the term “land” does not convey, such as topography, ecology, fertility of 
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land, climate, location, and underground minerals.9  Since these implicit factors are all 
related to geography, and affect a population’s production and consumption costs, they 
should be included in budget constraints.  It is mainly the differences in these 
geographically based budget constraints that shaped the path of development of particular 
human clusters.  Therefore, information about geography is highly relevant in projecting 
the long-term development trajectory of particular population clusters and the limitations 
they faced.   
These geographical constraints must have shaped the way an early human community 
consumed, produced, and behaved.10 Each human community would have been induced 
or forced by geographical conditions to embark on a certain path of social, economic and 
cultural evolution.  In this sense, the differentiations in culture, preferences, tastes, 
technology, behavior, organizations, and institutions must have developed at a much later 
stage, and been shaped by silent but dominating geographical factors.  The different 
geographical factors, the ultimate exogenous variables, explain to a great extent, although 
not deterministically, why the same Homo sapiens eventually evolved into different 
peoples with different collective preferences, cultures, technology, behavior, 
organizations, and institutions.   
2.2 New light shed by the H-O model and the Rybczynski Theorem 
The H-O model is mostly used in international trade, but actually has deeper implications 
relevant to endogenous urbanization and growth, and to the Needham puzzle.  The model 
                                                 
9 This list is certainly not exhaustive.  For example, whether a plain was covered with or grasses could be 
important in determining why the Chinese civilization emerged much later than the Middle East 
civilization.  
10 They would choose herding if living in grassland, hunting if living in a forest, fishing if living close to 
water, gathering and later farming if living on a fertile plain, trading if living in a strategic locality, or 
warring if living in a barren environment that was next to a rich but vulnerable target.   
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is mainly based on the geographical fact that natural resources are not evenly distributed 
across the world.  Comparative advantage comes from the differences in factor 
proportions, or in factor availability across nations.  Within this framework, Rybczynski 
proves that when an economy loses a certain amount of its endowment of one factor of 
production, the sector that does not use this factor intensively will expand at the expense 
of the sector that does use this factor intensively.      
This theorem has interesting implications.  Assume an economy has two sectors, one 
labor-intensive (say urban) and the other land-intensive (say agriculture), and for some 
reason the economy loses some of its land.  The immediate effect is a worsening man-to-
land ratio, which leads to the decline of the land-intensive sector, in our case, agriculture.  
Meanwhile, the labor-intensive sector, in our case, the urban sector, will expand by 
gaining land and labor at the expense of agriculture.  The expansion of urban sector is 
endogenous here.  As a nation’s urban sector expands and benefits from the 
agglomeration effects, the nation is more likely to see acceleration of accumulation and 
spillover of human capital, technical progress, and institutional innovation (Lucas 1988 
and 1993; Barro 1990 and 1998; Yang and Ng 1999).   
The opposite holds if a nation for some reason acquires new land, causing an improved 
man-to-land ratio.  Population will disperse to newly acquired land, causing the 
expansion of the land-intensive sector, in this case, agriculture, and the contraction of the 
labor-intensive sector, in this case, the urban sector.  This implies that existing urban 
centers will decline, and as the consequence of losing some of the agglomeration effect, 
part of the factors such as acceleration of accumulation and spillover of human capital, 
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technical progress, and institutional innovation that are conducive to endogenous growth 
will be lost too.   
2.3 China’s problematic land data 
By using geographical endowments and their changes, we also can circumvent the 
serious problem caused by inconsistency in the Chinese historical data on cultivated land.  
For example, it is well established that the Sui dynasty was significantly smaller than the 
Tang in terms of territory (Tan 1982, Vol. 5), and it started in the Tang dynasty, a 
dynasty after the Sui, that the land in South China started to be reclaimed.  However, 
according to Liang (1980),11 an authority on cultivated land in ancient China, the Sui had 
more cultivated land than the Tang dynasty.  We also know for sure that the territory of 
the Qing was much greater than that of the Sui (Tan 1982, Vol 5 and Vol. 8).  However, 
according to Liang, the cultivated land in the late Qing was less than half of that of the 
Sui. Such obvious mistakes can be avoided by using geographical boundaries instead of 
historical data on cultivated land.  
 
2.4 Main hypothesis and the definition of geographical endowments 
The central hypothesis of this paper is as follows.  The Needham puzzle can be explained 
by the differences and changes in geographical endowments that different civilizations 
faced in the pre-globalized world.  
This paper emphasizes the role of geographical factors in economic development and 
technical progress, but its approach is very different from the traditional geographic 
determinacy for the following two reasons.  First, in this paper geographical factors enter 
                                                 
11 I appreciate Liang’s effort to comb through all the historical documents in order to get the data on 
China’s cultivated land, and realize that in response to different tax policies under various dynasties, people 
could underreport their land to evade land taxes.    
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production and consumption through a nation’s long-term budget constraints.  Second, 
since geographical conditions of a specific area determine the initial carrying capacity of 
a land, and in turn the initial size of a population living on that land, population itself is 
an endogenous variable.  As Lin (1995), Kremer (1993), Diamond (1997), and this paper 
show, population’s size and growth can in turn affect many other factors including 
technical progress, transportation costs, and communication costs in dealing with 
neighboring societies. Therefore, while geographical factors cannot be deterministic 
forces in the formation of culture, institutions, or technologies, because the latter are 
contingent on many other factors, the geographical factors greatly reduce the range of 
possible outcomes in these domains. Using Mokyr’s term “constrained contingency” 
((2002), geographical factors serve exactly as such constraints by restricting the range of 
potential outcomes available to a society in a specific geographical location.  For example, 
it is much less likely for a Pacific island nation to independently invent a steam engine 
than for China or India.   
Based on such a constrained contingency, we still can argue that certain combinations of 
geography, topography, location, and climate are more conducive to the emergence of 
certain cultures, institutions, attitudes, world outlooks, and behavior.  They in turn are 
more conducive to knowledge accumulation, technological breakthroughs, resulting in 
faster economic growth and development.12 
 
                                                 
12 Sea-locked Japan evolved in a relatively more isolated environment than China until it came in contact 
with the Chinese civilization via the Korean peninsula.  In contrast, the continental nature of China’s 
geography exposed it to frequent invasions by the nomadic nations from the north and west, but never from 
the south, an area populated by agrarian nations.  Imagine what would have happened had India and the 
Southeast Asia been grassland or Gobi desert, but north to China been fertile land with sufficient rainfall 
and big rivers.   
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III. Geographical endowments and the successive rise of ancient civilizations 
3.1 Middle East—the key to the first Needham issue The answer to the first Needham issue, i.e., why China was not a leading nation in technology before 200 AD, is largely geographical.  Using the three criteria of civilization (evidences of a writing system; of urban centers; and of a hierarchical social structure), we immediately see that although the prehistory of China can be traced back to very ancient times, based on the dated evidence of the writing system, the Chinese civilization emerged much later than Sumer and Egypt in the Middle East.   
According to Diamond (1997) and Cook (2003), the sequencing of the emergence of 
civilizations is not a pure accident, but due to geographical reasons. The Middle East as a 
favorable habitat was the first stop for Homo sapiens on their way out of Southeast 
Africa.  The combined effects of the local climate and soil made this area the cradle for 
first sustained agricultural revolution and largest population concentration during the late 
Neolithic era, earlier than any other area on Earth.  A larger population accelerated the 
early emergence of civilization through the positive chain reactions described in Lin 
(1995), and in more detail in Diamond (1997).  The Middle East was not only the first to 
launch an agricultural revolution, but also the first to enter Bronze Age, about 5000 years 
ago, at least 1500 years earlier than the Yellow River Valley.  The Middle East also 
entered the Iron Age 3200 years ago, about 700 years earlier than China (Cook 2003 
p28).  In terms of technology, the Chinese civilization could not have been a leading 
nation throughout this long period. 
3.2 Unique Greek geography  
Before answering the second Needham issue, i.e., why modern science only emerged 
from European culture, we first must ask what conditions are conducive to the rise of 
science, and we find that geography again provides clues.  The spontaneous curiosity 
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about Nature and logical reasoning, criticisms of conventional wisdom, and challenges to 
norms and authorities, could happen among all cultures,13 but most cultures would not 
provide the right environment to encourage such critical thinking and rationality.  
Ancient Greece was an exception.  As Huff (1993) points out, “…the foundations of 
modern science, both cultural and institutional, are to be found precisely in those areas 
outside of science where men speculate about the nature of the cosmos, in its deepest and 
most mystical sense, and where the human imagination forges the institutions that allow 
individuals to perpetually enjoy neutral space free from the incursions of political and 
religious censors.” 
The freedom and tolerance that ancient Greeks enjoyed were related to Greek geography 
to a great extent.  Located on the Balkan Peninsula known for its deep mountainous 
inland, Greece did not have vast plains and big rivers to support a large agrarian 
population.  However, the small and scattered plains along its shores were ideal for the 
emergence of competing city-states (Cook 2003).  None of them had a population large 
enough to rise quickly to dominate other cities.  The unique Mediterranean climate 
combined with small and scattered plains was not particularly conducive to farming, 
especially not for grain, a typical land-intensive product.   
However, the Greek geography has the following merits. First, the location of Greece was 
strategic for the exchange of goods and knowledge with the nearby highly matured 
civilizations in the Middle East at a time when the Greeks were rising out of obscurity.14  
                                                 
13 Approximately at the same time China saw the rise of the Mohist school.  This school was interested in 
logic and scientific questions.  However, this school, together with many others, was soon suppressed by 
the first emperor of the Qin dynasty and was never encouraged by subsequent emperors (Cook 2003 p187). 
14 The influences from outside included the Minoan civilization in Crete that was deeply influenced by 
Egyptian civilization, the Persian civilization in Asia Minor that inherited much from the Sumerian, 
Assyrian, and Babylonian civilizations among others, and the Phoenician achievements in the fields of 
sailing, colonizing, and spelling system, to name a few.    
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Not only could they provide grain to the Greeks through trade, but also various 
intellectual stimuli. Second, since most Greek city-states were not self-sufficient in grain, 
and had to export wine, olive oil, and pottery among other commodities to trade for 
wheat and other food,15 the Greek economy, including its farming sector, was to a 
significant extent connected with domestic and foreign markets instead of being locally 
oriented.  Third, even with food imports, the city-states with their small plain could not 
accommodate their own population growth.  Consequently, overseas commercial 
activities, adventures and colonization became necessities in the Ancient Greek lives 
(Bairoch 1988).  There was a built-in incentive among Greeks to be outward-looking, to 
seek information, and to be curious about the outside world in order to secure foreign 
markets for trade and overseas territory for emigration.  The Greeks had plural reference 
systems provided by the Minoans, Egyptians, Babylonians, Persians, Assyrians, and 
Phoenicians among others.  Many Greek scholars traveled extensively to these 
civilization centers.16  Fourth, the Aegean and the Mediterranean played “a mediating and 
unifying role” (Bairoch 1988 p71) among surrounding civilizations, while also forming 
natural barriers for foreign powers.  This permitted the Greeks a more independent path 
of evolution.  Fifth, a peninsula with only one way out, very similar to an island, tends to 
screen out intruders, resulting in ethnic homogeneity (Cook 2003).  The competing Greek 
city-states shared the same language, culture, and tradition. 
                                                 
15 According to Bairoch’s estimation, “…Greece probably had to import a quantity of grain sufficient to 
support some 20-40% of its urban population, if not more.” (1988 p77)  
16 See, for example, what Herodotus wrote in his famous History about his own travel experiences in Egypt 
and other Middle Eastern countries.  
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3.3. Answer to the second Needham issue 
However, these five reasons can only explain why Greeks rose from obscurity to the 
forefront of the world arena in a relatively short period of time.  The Greek catching-up, 
while impressive, was by no means unique.  Throughout history, numerous nations have 
risen from obscurity in relatively short periods of time.  Those who happened to live next 
to inspiring civilizations could have very steep learning curves, especially when they 
were motivated to imitate.  China itself witnessed the fast catching-up of numerous 
nomadic nations living along its northern border.  Various nomadic tribes learned almost 
every technical trick from China in just several hundred years before many of them 
defeated China on the battlefield.  
However, usually the growth in barbarians’ knowledge and technology leveled off after 
catching up.  What really made the Greek experience a miraculous exception lies first in 
the fact that during the classical period, the ancient Greeks leaped forward, leaving other 
civilizations far behind in terms of technology and scientific thinking, and second, in the 
fact that the Greeks succeeded in achieving this feat with a relatively small population 
size,17 a departure from all the other ancient civilizations.  What the Greeks achieved 
cannot be explained by Lin’s hypothesis, but can be by geographical hypothesis of this 
paper.  The unique geography of Greece gave rise to its unique social institutions and 
organizations.  The latter in turn gave the Greeks a big edge over all the other 
civilizations in acquiring unconventional sources of growth.   
                                                 
17According to Bairoch (1988 p76), the total population of Greece around 500 BC was about two millions. 
On average, a typical city-state had a small population of no more than 20, 000.  Among the few that had a 
larger urban center, Athens had the largest population.  The urbanization levels of different city-states 
varied in the range of 15-30%.  Obvious, the total population of ancient Greece was easily dwarfed by other 
agrarian civilizations.      
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First, Athens and some other Greek city-states adopted democracy. Consequently, truths 
could be sought openly without the fear of political persecution by kings or priests who 
often viewed truths as their monopoly.  Second, the Greeks benefited from the 
agglomeration effect that arose from its many competing urban centers.  Third, the 
inherent urge to trade with and colonize other areas around the Mediterranean encouraged 
not only scholars, but the public at large to be curious about foreign markets, foreign 
cultures, and foreign ideas in order to get information relevant to commercial interests 
and colonial enterprises.  Fourth, the Greeks must have benefited from gains from trade. 
Such gains, which did not dawn on any nation until Ricardo explained them in his theory 
of comparative advantage, are part of the reason why Athens and other city-states with 
small population and barren land could have completed so many huge public works 
during the short classical period (510-331 BC).  Fifth, the adoption of the spelling system 
that the Greeks learned from the neighboring Phoenicians must have greatly eased the 
difficulties in reading and writing, and hence promoted education among Greeks.  The 
human capital of an average Greek citizen must have been higher than his or her 
counterpart in other civilizations where hieroglyphs, pictographs, or cuneiforms were in 
use.  In the latter case, only a very small upper class, mostly noblemen and priests, could 
have the leisure and resources to learn and master them.  The vast majority was left 
illiterate and ignorant.   
In summary, when the writing system and knowledge were not monopolized by a small 
upper class, when political institutions were based on democracy, when urban centers 
attract people of all walks to meet, to deal, to debate, and to participate in public policy 
decisions, when an economy was market driven and trade oriented, and when competitive 
17 
 
trade and commercial activities demanded fact-based information and accurate 
accounting, then errors, mistakes, misinformation, superstition, blind obedience, and 
unchallenged and unaccountable authorities would more likely yield to fearless searches 
for truth, logic and fact-based reasoning.  Such an environment would more likely 
provide fertile soil for the rise of rationality, scientific thinking, and scientific 
methodology.  
Some of the Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, and Herophilus 
should be referred to as scientists today, because they already knew how to use deductive 
techniques or fact-based experiments to test refutable proposition in their reasoning and 
experiments. Logic-based and facts-based critical thinking was the very basis of scientific 
methodology.  In this sense, it is indeed true that the embryo of modern science arose first 
in ancient Greek philosophy (Yang 2003 p3).  This new way of thinking enabled Greece 
to overcome its small population size to deepen and broaden their epistemic base, which 
in turn helped them to accelerate scientific and technological progress. 
 
IV. The Elvin hypothesis and the technological explosion in the Song  
4.1 The third Needham issue 
The answer to the third Needham issue, i.e., why China became a leading nation only in 
the field of practical technology during the period from the second to sixteenth century 
AD, according to Lin (1995) lies in the size of China’s population when invention was 
experience-based.  However, Lin’s hypothesis cannot explain why ancient Greece with a 
very small population had so many inventions and turned itself into an embryo of modern 
sciences (Mokyr 2002).  His hypothesis also cannot explain why it was particularly in the 
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Song that China saw an explosion of technological innovations despite the fact the China 
became the most populous nation in the world since very early on (Maddison 2001).  
4.2 Elvin’s hypothesis, the H-O theory and the Social Changes behind the Song Miracle 
In 1.2 we introduced Elvin’s hypothesis, and mentioned that there are problems with his 
theory too.  A first problem with Elvin’s hypothesis is factual.  He assumes that land area 
was constant (1973 p313).  In reality, China experienced significant fluctuations in its 
boundaries, and consequently in the availability of arable land.  Elvin also assumes that 
China’s population was increasing linearly over time.  In reality, China experienced 
severe losses of population at the beginning of almost every dynasty except for the Song.  
Combining these two facts, we can see that the man-to-land ratio, instead of rising 
monotonically, often improved for an extended period before worsening again.   
A second problem in Elvin’s hypothesis is logical.  His hypothesis cannot explain why it 
was mainly during the Song dynasty when China’s population pressure peaked as a result 
of fast growing population combined with losing large amount of arable land to invading 
nomads that China made the most profound technical advances (Fairbank and Goldman 
2006).  
The Song experience is a challenge to either Lin’s hypothesis or to that of Elvin’s.  The 
following socio-economic changes taking place during that period represented a major 
breakaway from China’s self-sufficient agrarian past.  First, China’s most important 
inventions indeed took place during this period (Elvin 1973; Landes 1998; Qi 1999).  
Second, China reached its highest urbanization level, and the functions of urban centers 
underwent profound changes during this period.  Third, it was during Song that the 
Chinese government relaxed its monopoly and allowed the private sector to participate in 
19 
 
foreign trade by transforming the money-losing tribute system to a commercially 
sustainable trade system.  Fourth, as a result of these social and economic changes, for 
the first and last time before the modern era China collected more tax and tariff revenues 
from commerce and trade than from its land (Fairbank and Goldman 2006).  Let’s 
examine the facts in detail and see why it is relevant to introduce the H-O theory and the 
Rybczynski theorem, given that both Lin and , .  
4.3 The external changes in Territory and the consequent change in man-to-land ratio 
during the Song 
Compared with the Tang (618-907 AD), China during the Song (960-1279 AD)18 lost the 
control of the Great Wall right at its birth. Hence, part of the North China Plain was lost 
to northern nomads and the rest of it was exposed to frequent harassment, plunders, and 
invasions.  Many Chinese were forced to migrate to the South from the North to seek 
security.  China eventually lost the whole North China Plain to the Jin in 1127 AD and 
retreated to the south of the Huai River.   
Unfortunately, the plains in the South were much smaller than the North China Plain, and 
mainly located along the middle and lower Yangtze and its tributaries, separated by hills 
and mountains.  The combined effects of the influx of migrants from the North and the 
lack of ready-for-use arable land in the South resulted in rising population pressure 
throughout the Song.  
                                                 
18 From 907 – 960 AD, the so-called Five Dynasties period, was one of the many times when China split 
into many small states.  But this was the only period when its population was growing continuously.  
During other periods when China dissolved into many small states, or when an old dynasty’s was replaced 
by a new one, population as a rule plunged significantly.     
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4.4 Urban expansion and functional transformation 
In response to the worsening man-to-land ratio during the Song, as the H-O theory and 
Rybczynski Theorem predict, China’s labor-intensive sector expanded, resulting in the 
growth of urban population and the rise of service sector.  The Song witnessed the 
highest urbanization level throughout the whole history of China until 1980s (Chao 
1995).  Kaifeng (Bianjing) and Hangzhou (Lin’an), as the capitals of the Northern and 
Southern Song respectively, were the largest cities in the contemporary world, boasting 
more than one million people each.  In addition, there were many other large cities, 
according to Gernet (1962) and Shiba (1975), such as Suzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, and 
Quanzhou.  They were all internationally renowned manufacturing centers or trade ports 
with large populations. According to C. Huang (2003), new cities specializing in ceramic 
production were also emerging along the Fujian and Zhejiang coastal areas during the 
Song in response to the growing demand for porcelain from overseas, although they were 
deserted later during the Ming and Qing.     
China also saw profound transformation of functions played by urban centers during the 
Song.  In the Tang dynasty and earlier, cities mainly played a political role as national or 
provincial centers, or as military strongholds.  Commercial activities in cities were 
subject to political or military restrictions.  According to Yang (2003, pp 237-238), city 
authorities before the Song imposed very restrictive rules on business activities.  For 
example, each city designated only a few walled marketplaces for commercial use.  
Government guards patrolled these places regularly and locked up the gates after the 
officially designated business hours. There was little life in cities after dark。  All the 
city gates were closed.  One needed special permits to move around or to pass through 
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any of the city gates.  Those who walked around without permits were subject to penalty 
or arrest. Beside the officially designated marketplaces, no other places within a city 
could be used for commercial activities.  Houses could only have windows and doors 
facing back alleys or small lanes.  Along the thoroughfares the city authorities did not 
allow windows or doors to be installed so no one could have a peep at the movement of 
officials or garrisons.  Even all the lanes and alleys had their own gates, and were locked 
up after dark.  The curfews imposed on cities and the regulations governing the 
marketplaces, while maximizing the security of cities as political centers or military 
strongholds, prevented economic and commercial activities from thriving.   
During the Song, curfews and regulations of this type were lifted.  Commercial activities 
were allowed in most parts of a city at any time.  Residents were allowed to open front 
doors and windows into main streets and thoroughfares, or convert their houses into 
shops and stores.  The government encouraged the formation of various guilds (Chen and 
Qiao 1998) because they helped facilitate the collection of commercial taxes.  They also 
played a more positive role in protecting free competition among member firms. 
4.5 From money-losing tribute system to mutually beneficial trade system  
As Fairbank and Goldman (2006) point out, during the Han and Tang dynasties, China 
replaced its trade system with the tribute system.19  However, this tribute system 
underwent profound changes during the Song.  Defeated and humiliated frequently by 
Liao, Jin, and later by the Mongolians, the Chinese emperors during the Song had few 
illusions that they were superior to their neighbors, a belief that the Chinese officials and 
people typically had before and after the Song.  Landes (2006) has emphasized this belief 
                                                 
19 The tribute system actually aimed at political loyalty and the respect China sought from its neighbors.  In 
return, China showered them lavish gifts such as silk, porcelain, and other highly regarded handicrafts.  
These exchanges often became heavy financial burdens for China. 
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as one possible explanation of China’s failure to learn from foreigners. During the Song 
period, the fact that China had to pay heavy tributes to northern powers to buy short-lived 
peace made the Song emperors more pragmatic in their attitudes toward trade and foreign 
merchants (C. Huang 2003).  According to him, China abolished many of the practices 
typically observed under the tribute system.  For example, in order to reduce financial 
losses, The Song government discouraged its neighboring nations from sending their 
envoys to China, but encouraged foreign merchants to come in order to raise more tariff 
revenues.  
The government also relaxed its monopoly on international trade, viewing tariff revenues 
as an important source of income.  It allowed the private sector to trade directly with 
foreign merchants in China or abroad, a policy that China abandoned in the Ming and 
Qing.  In order to share the possible risks inherent to overseas trade, people tried new 
commercial and financial practices (C. Huang 2003).  The lucrative nature of foreign 
trade attracted people of all walks, from merchants to ordinary people, from officials to 
generals, even nuns and monks.  China had never seen its trade ties so extended as during 
the Song.  Foreign merchants from Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, and East 
Africa came to China via maritime routes.  Copper coins, silk, tea, porcelain, and many 
other labor-intensive manufactured products, and knowledge-intensive products such as 
books and paintings were among the most sought-after Chinese exports.  In return, China 
imported grain, cattle, timber, minerals, spices and other land-intensive products.  
Chinese ships, known for their size and weight, and guided for the first time in the world 
history by magnetic compasses, regularly visited ports in Southeast Asian and the Indian 
Ocean (C. Huang 2003).  It was also during the Song that China became the first nation 
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in the world to adopt paper money and put it into wide circulation, a breakthrough in 
monetization and commercialization.  This invention reflected both the growing demand 
for money, and willingness to base business on trust and credit.  
4.6 The Song was searching for a different path from its past 
The combined effect of the rising urbanization level, the changing orientation in urban 
functions, the wider division of labor, prosperous commerce and international trade, the 
wider use of money including paper money, and the highly visible participation of the 
private sector in foreign trade, provided a more favorable environment for new inventions 
during the Song.  An increasingly open economy enabled China to start to organize its 
production in a manner responsive to the changes in its own factor endowment by 
exploring possible divisions of labor and specialization beyond its borders (but still 
within the world known to China).  Not accidentally, Fairbank and Goldman (2006) point 
out that China collected for the first time and last time in its long history until the modern 
era more tax and tariff revenues from commerce and trade than from its land during the 
Song.  
The extensive trade relations with foreign nations also suggest that there could be 
relatively free exchanges of ideas and information between China and its trading partners.  
According to C. Huang (2003) many Arab merchants actually chose to live in China’s big 
cities such as Quanzhou.  Given the fact that during this period Arabs were keepers of the 
ancient Greek legacy and were leading the world in many fields (Huff 1993), these 
exchanges with Arabs and other nations must have provided a favorable and stimulating 
environment in China for new inventions and innovations, and more importantly, for their 
rapid applications, a rare phenomenon in China after the Song.  As Landes (2006) points 
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out, most of time in China “the history of advances, …, is one of points of light, 
separated in space and time, unlinked by replication and testing, obfuscated by metaphor 
and pseudo-profundity, limited in diffusion… in effect, a succession of ephemera.”   
The Song dynasty was an obvious exception. Of course,  
 
V.  Territory expansion and technological stagnation 
5.1 The fourth Needham issue 
Now let’s look at the possible answer to the fourth Needham issue as to why China lost 
its technological lead and then, after the 16th century, became a relatively backward 
nation even in practical techniques.  While Western Europe resumed the path once taken 
by the ancient Greeks characterized by urbanization, democracy, commerce and trade, 
and overseas colonization, China was induced to retreat back to its agrarian past from the 
track sought after during the Song.  This divergence not only explains why Europe 
advanced so fast, but also explains why China degenerated into a backward nation so 
dramatically.   
Let’s take a look at the man-to-land ratio after the Song.  The subsequent dynasties after 
the Song (960-1279) are the Yuan (1271-1368), Ming (1368-1644), and Qing (1644-
1911).  Each of the three dynasties experienced, at least at their early periods, population 
declines relative to their territory.  These trends were the opposite of the Song’s 
experience.20  China’s man-to-land ratio actually improved throughout the whole Yuan 
period, most of the Ming period, and from the early to middle Qing for the following 
reasons.   
                                                 
20 Population in the middle Ming experienced further growth after recovering to the peak of the Song.  The 
Qing repeated the same pattern, although it grew to a much larger population in the 18th century.  However, 
throughout the Yuan, the population never reversed its declining trend. 
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First, in Table 1 and Figure 1 we can see that throughout the whole Yuan, population 
continued to decline while China’s territory became much larger than that of the Song 
(Tan 1982, Vol. 7).  Second, during the early Ming, China saw a declining population 
until 1400.  Its total population did not surpass the peak of the Song until around 1500 
(Figure 1).  It is true that the Ming’s total territory was smaller than that of the Yuan, but 
much greater than that of the Song.  What the Ming lost were Mongolia and Xinjiang 
(Tan 1982, Vol. 7), which were never China’s main agrarian areas.  Compared with the 
Song, the Ming’s territory was much greater, as the country regained the whole North 
China Plain, part of Manchuria and the whole Southwest.  All these regions had favorable 
climates for agriculture.  By pushing the northern border back to the Great Wall and 
beyond, the Ming secured the North China Plain, the most important agrarian area in 
China since ancient times.  Third, and most importantly, after the middle Ming, land-
saving and water-saving crops such as peanuts, potatoes, sweet potatoes, corn, and 
cotton, were introduced into China and expanded rapidly. This significantly enhanced the 
carrying capacity of the hilly South and mountainous Southwest, making them the new 
destinations for large-scale migration.  Because of the relatively short growing period, 
these crops were also suitable for the fertile but cold Manchuria plain.  
Combining all these factors, it is safe to say that compared with the Song, the man-to-
land ratio during the first half of the Ming (1368 to 1500) was actually improved.  Even 
after then, this ratio did not deteriorate immediately for the following reasons.  First, the 
Ming had a much larger territory than the Song, but its population was about the same as 
the Song by 1500.  Second, given the availability of land and water-saving crops in the 
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late Ming, the man-to-land ratio would not become much worse until 1600 when its 
population grew to be much larger than that of the Song.    
The Qing had a similar pattern with regard to the changes in its man-to-land ratio.  In 
Table 1, we can see that the population declined at the beginning of the Qing, and it did 
not recover to the Ming’s peak of 160 million until after 1700.  Meanwhile, during the 
Qing dynasty, China’s territory was further expanded from what it had been under the 
Ming’s reign.  It gained the whole of Mongolia, secured control over Xinjiang, Tibet and 
its adjacent areas, acquired Taiwan, and expanded and secured its control over the whole 
of Manchuria.  Except for Manchuria, some parts of Xinjiang, and Taiwan, it is true that 
the other newly acquired or secured territories were not good for China’s traditional 
staple crops of rice and wheat.  But when potatoes, sweet potatoes, peanuts, corn, and 
cotton became part of farmers’ choices, these newly acquired or secured territories 
actually accommodated much of the population who migrated in large-scale from eastern 
and central China.     
This is exactly what the H-O model and the Rybczynski theorem predict.  According to 
them, the acquisition of new territory will lead to the expansion of the land-intensive 
sector at the expense of the labor-intensive sector.  In light of these theories, we should 
expect to see the spread of population from the center to more peripheral areas in pursuit 
of arable land.  Urbanization levels would decline as a result of the contraction of the 
labor-intensive sector.  During the Ming and Qing, as large amounts of population moved 
to the vast and newly secured inland and deep mountains at a time when transportation 
and communication infrastructures were backward, the economy became more inward 
looking and self-sufficient. The importance of domestic commerce and foreign trade 
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declined.  All these socio-economic changes led to a decline in the nationwide divisions 
of labor, reduced specialization, reduced levels of urbanization, reduced agglomeration 
effects, and stagnant technology.  Let’s look at the empirical data in detail.  
5.2 Large-scale migration to the new frontier   
From the Yuan on, China saw its population increasingly dispersed, usually from the 
center to the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast.  The linguistic evidence supports this 
statement.  For example, China’s Southwest covers a huge geographical area known for 
high mountains and deep valleys.  As the severe differentiation of dialects in China’s 
hilly Southeast21 shows, language in the mountainous terrain of China’s Southwest 
should have also highly differentiated.  Surprisingly, the dialects prevailing in this area 
today are very close to Mandarin and can be understood by Mandarin-speakers.  Since 
Mandarin as an accent was formed during the Yuan, and has become the prevailing 
accent in the North China Plain since then, one can infer that the majority of the local 
people in the Southwest must be the descendents of those who came from China’s 
Mandarin-speaking areas during or after the short-lived Yuan period.   
Beside the difficulties in transportation and communication caused by high mountains 
and deep valleys, long distance usually also plays a significant role in differentiating 
dialects from their mother tongue and from each other.  However, the accents of the 
dialects in Northwest and Northeast are very similar to that of Mandarin despite the 
                                                 
21 In sharp contrast to China’s Southwest, in China’s Southeast there are many highly differentiated 
dialects.  The local dialects in Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Hunan are very hard, if 
not completely impossible, to understand for Mandarin-speakers today.  Although the accent of the local 
dialects was close to that of China’s central area as late as during the Tang, the mountains, valleys, long 
distances, and long intervals of separation from their mother tongue made these dialects very different from 
each other, let alone Mandarin, in their accents.  
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remote distance.  This fact suggests that the local population in China’s Northwest and 
Northeast were descendents of more recent migrants from Mandarin-speaking areas.   
Historical documents show that during the Yuan, Ming, and Qing, there was large-scale 
migration.  First, in response to the depletion of the population in the North China Plain 
by wars and nomadic invasions, the early Ming emperors forced the populations of some 
big cities in the lower Yangtze (the most developed area in contemporary China) to move 
to the North (Chen and Qiao 1998 pp24-25).  As population pressure built up in China’s 
central area, more people were driven into more hilly or mountainous areas in Southern 
Anhui, Western Hunan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Yuannan, and Sichuan during the Ming.  
During the Qing, as the population pressure built up again in central China, many moved 
to the Northwest (the Central Asian part of China) and the Northeast (Manchuria).      
5.3 Declined urbanization level            
China’s urbanization level, from the peak of 22% during the Song fell to as low as 9% in 
the late Qing (Chao 1995).22  China also saw the relative stagnation of its large urban 
centers compared with Europe.  For example, although China was known as the home of 
some of the largest cities in the world during the Song, such as Kaifeng, Hangzhou 
(Lin’an), and Quanzhou,23 and despite the fact that China was the most populous nation 
in the world, between the period 1500-1900, not even one of the ten largest cities in the 
world was located in China.  
                                                 
22 Elvin (1973), Skinner (1977), and Bairoch (1988) also notice the reverse in China’s urbanization level 
since the Song.    
23 Bairoch quotes a great Arab traveler and writer as saying that Quanzhou during the 13th century to 14th 
century with a population of 500,000 was the largest port in the world.  However, according to Bairoch, its 
population shrank gradually to an extent that it was “practically vanishing by the mid-nineteenth century.” 
(1988 p354) 
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No wonder that Fairbank and Goldman (2006, p.172) feel “strange that after the Song 
cities of Kaifeng and Hangzhou were established, no great cities of over a million emerge 
in China until the nineteenth century.”   If big cities symbolize a higher level of division 
of labor and specialization, the stagnation in the growth of big cities certainly indicates 
stagnation in the deepening of division of labor and specialization of the Chinese society.  
As population dispersed to the vast inland, as predicted by the H-O theory, the household 
industries also spread from coastal areas to the vast, formerly underdeveloped inland to 
overcome the increasing transportation and communication costs.    
In response to the inward movement of population, and the “ruralization” (Chao 1995) or 
“familization” (Phillp Huang 1991) of handicraft industries, China saw the emergence of 
numerous small towns in its vast inland to cater to the needs of the localized marketing, 
production and regional interactions (Skinner 1977).   
 
5.4 Zheng He’s voyages and the closed-door policy  
It is well established that throughout most periods of the Ming and Qing, China followed 
a closed-door policy (Fairbank and Goldman 2006) with two exceptions.  The first was 
during the period 1405-1433 when Zheng He, with support from Emperor Yongle, 
mounted seven naval expeditions to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and 
East Africa.  The second exception was during the late Qing when China was forced to 
open five seaports to foreign trade in 1842 after the first Opium War.  In between these 
two historical events, China only opened its doors briefly several times throughout most 
of this long period. Foreign merchants were only allowed to visit Guanghzou as a special 
favor. They were not permitted to live in Guangzhou permanently, let alone travel around 
or reside outside Guangzhou.  By confining foreign merchants to the small quarters of 
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Guangzhou, the vast majority of Chinese were never exposed to new ideas or new 
products from the West except for a few things such as the drug opium. 
Zheng’s grandiose voyages themselves have very limited impact on China’s economy, 
ideology, and institutions.  Zheng’s adventures were remembered mostly for the large 
number of and the huge size of his boats, the massive size of his entourage, the lavish 
way in which he showered gifts on various local authorities that he met during his 
voyages, the maritime distance that his fleet covered, and the historical fact that China 
reached East Africa ahead of Europe.  While it is truly a remarkable achievement by 
China to have launched these voyages, they left almost no imprint on China’s economic 
development, financial and trade institutions, geographical or anthropological 
discoveries, or philosophical outlook.  Not motivated by commercial incentives or 
scientific curiosity, Zheng, in sharp contrast to the Song’s merchants and the later 
European adventurers, did not find any worthwhile trade opportunities in this vast area 
except for some exotic birds and animals.  Politically, Zheng accomplished a lot in 
restoring the reputation of the Celestial Empire which had been stained by the “barbarian 
Mongolians” during the Yuan, and in reviving the tribute system.  Geographically and 
economically, Zheng accomplished little, not even finding any land or a maritime route 
unknown to the Arabs or Indians.  Ranking officials at the imperial court sharply 
criticized his voyages as a waste of the nation’s treasury.  Mainly for this reason, China 
not only stopped sending any more fleets abroad after Emperor Yongle passed away, but 
also burned all the blueprints of the ships and the maritime maps used by Zheng.  China 
also prohibited non-official trade with foreign nations, and put foreign trade once again 
under the yoke of the tribute system as in the Han and Tang, an unfortunate setback from 
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the path that the Song’s China was taking. The question is, how could China do so 
without triggering shortages of food or even causing famine?  The answer lies in the fact 
that, different from the Song’s China, China in the Ming and Qing had greatly expanded 
land territory.  
By the late Qing population pressure was rising again and there is evidence that China 
was looking for a way out of the agrarian trap. But it was already too late.   In the period 
after the 16th century, Western Europe resumed the path of overseas trade and commerce 
that the ancient Greeks once explored but stopped.  During this period in China, however, 
after having greatly expanded its continental territory and improved its man-to-land ratio 
for extended intervals, the nation seemed to be trapped in agrarian society. 
Interestingly, the timing of territory expansion seems very important for a nation to 
accelerating or delaying transition to a modern society.  For instance, Portugal and Spain 
greatly expanded their overseas territory in America since the 16th century without first 
having their home political and economic institutions fundamentally changed. Therefore, 
they basically duplicated from their home the hierarchical social structures in the colonies, 
resulting in the consolidation of the privileges enjoyed by elites at home and overseas, 
and a much slower transition to become modern and developed societies both in Portugal 
and Spain, and in many Latin American nations compared with Canada and the US.  The 
latter two were once colonies acquired by the Great Britain at a time when it already had 
profound social and economic changes that eventually led to Industrial Revolution, 
accelerated urbanization, and the gradual expansion of voting rights among its citizens.  
According to Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), these two nations represent a sharp contrast 
with many of the Latin American nations, the relative equity in human capital through 
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public schooling, political rights, and more equal land distribution among citizens greatly 
facilitated faster economic growth, social equity, and more successful social transition in 
the US and Canada.  Russia represents another interesting case.  It acquired a large 
amount of continental territory under the Tsars since 16th century in Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia, and Siberia.  According to Domar (1989)    
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
As China is poised to become the next economic superpower, interest in the Needham 
puzzle has been revived.  China’s past experience indeed looks dazzling and puzzling at 
the same time. Rising from obscurity to become the world leader in technology in the 
second century AD, it held this title for the next 14 centuries.  China then slipped into the 
lamentable status of one of the poorest nations in the world in the following few 
centuries.   
Scholars turn to different hypotheses to explain the causes of this slippage, such as 
China’s conservative and introverted culture and traditional values (as reflected in 
Confucianism), xenophobic attitudes to non-Chinese things, repressive bureaucracy and 
autocracy, mind-binding civil service examinations, lack of diffusing and supporting 
institutions, Western imperialism, or the worsening man-to-land ratio.  All of them have 
various degrees of explanatory power, but except for the last two, all of them are 
endogenous and shaped by some underlying variables.  For example, Confucianism was 
often cited in the past as a negative factor in causing East Asia’s backwardness; but now 
it is often cited as a positive factor in cultivating work ethics and respect for authorities 
that led to East Asian Miracle.  Such contradiction greatly weakens the explanatory 
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power of culture as a convincing variable. The case of the Song dynasty shows that the 
Chinese were willing and able to change their values, attitude, and behavior when some 
fundamental variables such as the geographical factors changed.  
The only two hypotheses listed above that could be viewed as exogenous or quasi-
exogenous are Western imperialism and the worsening man-to-land ratio.  To be fair, 
Western nations did not exert major impacts on China until 1842 when China was 
defeated and forced to open at the end of the first Opium War.  By then China had long 
lost its technological lead，therefore， this hypothesis is irrelevant logically for our 
purpose.  The other hypothesis, often cited as Elvin’s hypothesis of high level 
equilibrium trap because it is based on worsening man-to-land ratio, also cannot answer 
the question of why it was exactly during the Song dynasty when the man-to-land ratio 
was sharply worsened that China achieved most impressive technological advances.  
Elvin’s hypothesis also cannot explain why China failed to achieve major technical 
progress during the period from the early Ming to the middle Qing when its social surplus 
should rise as a result of its greatly expanded territory, the availability of land-saving and 
water-saving crops such as corn and potatoes from the new continent, but population was 
yet to explode.  It seems that without having the social-economic institutions changed 
first, such as one sees in the Song period, or in ancient Greece, or in England since the 
medieval period, the increased availability of social surplus tends to be translated into 
population explosion everywhere, as Malthus predicted, and the Elvin hypothesis implies.  
Therefore, it is important for a nation to achieve faster technical progress to have 
institutional and social structural changes first.  
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Based on the implications of the H-O model, the Rybczynski theorem, and the 
endogenous growth, particularly the agglomeration effect, this paper uses geographical 
endowments and their exogenous changes through the changes in a nation’s boundaries 
as its main explanatory variables in explaining why a nation’s socio-economic will 
undergo changes, even unconscientiously. This is because geographical endowments and 
their exogenous changes in a nation’s boundaries can shape endogenous variables such as 
a nation’s culture, ideologies, attitude, institutions, and technologies through a nation’s 
budget contraint, but cannot be shaped by them in return.  Through its interaction with 
population, and through budget constraints, geographical variables also interact with 
other variables in its production function or utility function by limiting their possible 
outcomes through what Mokyr called constrained contingency.  Therefore, geographical 
endowments in this paper are not deterministic, but will increase or decrease the 
likelihood of certain direction that a nation will take in a period when globalization had 
not started yet and each nation was still live in relative isolation.    
This approach sheds new light on the experiences of the Song dynasty and the subsequent 
dynasties.  As China gradually lost the North China Plain to the invading nomads and 
migrants flooded to the South from the North during the Song, its population pressure 
rose sharply against shrinking taxable land acreage. The heavy burden to finance wars 
and the need to pay indemnity to invading nomads triggered profound social-economic 
changes.  China was forced to depend less on agriculture and land taxes, and thus forced 
to transform its society into a more urban and commercial one.  The Song not only saw a 
rising urbanization level, deepening divisions of labor, and extended trade ties with 
overseas nations, but also was experiencing the transformation of urban functions.  Cities 
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as bureaucratic and military centers with various restrictions on commercial and civilian 
activities before the Song evolved into more commercially and manufacturing oriented 
centers that were more open and friendly to ordinary people’s business and other 
activities.  Even the tribute system, once tightly monopolized by the government before 
the Song, was induced by the prospect of lucrative tariff revenues to open up to allow the 
participation of the private sector and foreign merchants.  All these changes point to the 
fact that China during the Song was experimenting, although unconscientiously, with a 
new path as a response to the unfavorable changes in its geographical boundaries. In 
retrospect, we can see that this path was different from China’s past to a significant extent, 
thus full of unknown risks and resistances. We will never know what would have 
happened had the fragile peace between the aggressive Mongolians and the commercially 
prosperous but militarily weak Song been somehow maintained for a protracted period.  
This paper is not claiming that had the Song succeeded in keeping the peace for a much 
longer period, since the Song had more advanced weaponry than the nomads, China 
would have achieved Industrial Revolution independently and much earlier than England, 
because many of the necessary conditions for the Industrial Revolution were still missing 
in that region at the time.  But we can speculate that, given the continued population 
growth against very limited arable land available to it, the Song might seek more grain 
import from the neighboring countries such as Vietnam and Thailand and other Southeast 
Asian nations.  The firms in the labor-intensive sector would further expand their 
production and export.  In doing this, they would hire more laborers, new firms of the 
type would also rise and grow. These firms would also locate themselves closely to each 
other through try and error to benefit from the agglomeration effect.  The concentration 
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of large number of firms, their laborers, and their family members would also give rise to 
a growing service sector.  The same multiplying effect would take place within the 
service sector.  Obvious, this would lead to an even higher level of urbanization. No one 
would know where this gradual transition from a rural society to a more urban society, 
triggered by the reduction in geographical boundaries, would lead to.  However, as long 
as this transition were not stopped by exogenous forces, it would have been more likely, 
although not necessarily, to give rise to new technology, new financial arrangements, and 
new institutional innovations, just as what we see in the form of explosion of new 
technical and institutional inventions in the Song. 
The conquest of the Song by the Mongolians made the evolution toward this direction 
much less likely not only because the racially highly hierarchical and abusive regime 
under the Mongolian rule, but also by the subsequent changes in China’s geographical 
boundaries that actually greatly improved the man-to-land ratio for the whole Yuan, most 
of the Ming and from the early to middle Qing.  This improved ratio induced China to 
return to the much safer and more familiar agrarian past.  As the H-O model and the 
Rybczynski theorem predict, during the Ming and Qing the population became more 
spatially dispersed to its newly acquired territory.  Meanwhile, the urbanization level fell 
and big urban centers shrank.  China became inward looking with little interest in foreign 
trade and overseas exploration, as evidenced by the fact that China resumed the tribute 
system and closed its door to most foreign merchants during this period.  Consequently, 
the levels of division of labor and specialization fell, and technology became stagnant at a 
time when Europe switched its mode of innovation from experience-based one to 
experiment-based one, as Lin correctly points out.   
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 Table 1 
China's Demographical Changes from AD 1 to 1900 
Year Population (in thousands) 
AD 1 59,595 
960 (the first year of the North Song) 55,000 
1280 (the end of the South Song) 100,000 
1380 (towards the end of Yuan) 68,000 
1400 (early Ming) 72,000 
1480 116,000 
1490 98,000 
1500 (middle Ming) 103,000 
1600  160,000 
1640 (late Ming) 130,000 
1650 (early Qing) 123,000 
1700 138,000 
1720 (middle Qing) 177,800 
1750 260,000 
1800 341,600 
1850 412,000 
1900 (towards the end of Qing) 400,000 
Source： Based on Table D.1， Maddison, 1995. 
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